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I.

INTRODUCTION

Scarcely may the legal profession claim to be the originator of ethical rules proscribing one's service to persons with conflicting interests,

* Associate, Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, Columbia, South Carolina.
B.A. 1982, Furman University; J.D. 1985, University of Pennsylvania.

** Associate, Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, Columbia, South Carolina.
B.A. 1986, University of South Carolina; J.D. 1990, University of South Carolina.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

1

South
Carolina
Law Review,
Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [2020], Art.[Vol.
5
42
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW REVIEW
for such rules long predate legal memory.1 In fact, one of the most ancient of these precepts dates back to biblical times: "No man can serve
two masters: for either he will hate the one, and'2love the other; or else
he will hold to the one, and despise the other."
Lawyers properly may claim, however, to be among the first to incorporate these rules into their profession, being able to trace them
back at least to thirteenth-century England.3 The legal profession since
has significantly refined and expanded upon these once general and
often vague axioms intended to breed trust and loyalty. But who more
than lawyers should be charged with striving to perfect standards
which promote trust and loyalty? The very foundation on which a lawyer builds his practice wholly depends upon his clients' trust in him
and his loyalty to his clients.4 Ethical rules restricting representation of
clients with adverse interests, therefore, protect not only clients, although this is certainly their primary purpose, 5 but also the legal profession itself.
Since adoption of the original American Bar Association Code of
Professional Ethics in 1908, this country has possessed a codified rule

1. See Statute of Westminster I, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 39 (fixing legal memory at 1
Rich. 1 (Sept. 3, 1189)).
2. Matthew 6:24. At least one author cites this oft-quoted verse as the indisputable "original ethical prescription for human relationships from which [legal] disciplinary
rules are drawn."

R. ALEXANDER-SMITH,

CONFLICTS OF INTEREanS

MULTIPLE REPRESENTA-

TIONS 1 (1983).

3. See Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94
HARV. L. REv. 1244, 1292 n.43 (1981) [hereinafter Developments] ("The prohibition
against the simultaneous representation of conflicting interests can be found in one of
the earliest of professional codes, the London Ordinance of 1280: 'No counter is to undertake a suit (plai) to be partner in such suit or to take pay (lower) from both parties in
any action but well and lawfully he shall exercise his profession."' (quoting H. COHEN,A
HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH BAR AND ATTORNATUs TO 1450, at 233 (1929)).
4. This is a long recognized truth about which it has been written:
The greatest trust between man and man is the trust of giving counsel. For in
other confidences men commit the parts of life; their lands, their goods, their
child, their credit, some particular affair; but to such as they make their counsellors they commit the whole: by how much more they are obliged to all faith
and integrity.
12 ESSAYS OF COUNSEL: THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 147 (J. Spedding, R. Ellis & D.
Heath eds. 1872).
5. But see Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90
Htnv. L. REV. 702 (1977). Morgan suggests that certain provisions of the American Bar
Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility which purport to restrict representation by lawyers who are presented with a conflict actually serve the interests of the
bar more than those of the clients. The theory is that the rules potentially increase the
number of lawyers involved in the matter and, at the same time, decrease the level of
lawyer responsibility for identifying those cases in which actual conflicts are apt to develop. Id. at 727-28.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss4/5

2

Schmidt and McKelvey: Conflicts of Interest Among Existing Clients: The Civil Litigator
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
1991]
against representing clients with adverse interests.6 The rule has been
consistently developed and broadened in scope with almost every revision of the professional codes. Today, the rule is no longer "a" rule; it

is several rules. They are found in both the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (Model Code)7 and the recently adopted Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules). 8
It is important to discuss the restrictions on representing clients
with adverse interests under both the Model Code and the Model
Rules. Although the two exhibit many similarities, they also contain
notable differences. Furthermore, a number of jurisdictions still adhere
to the Model Code.9 Even those states that have adopted the Model
Rules cannot simply disregard the Model Code. Disciplinary proceedings in which ethical standards were breached while the Model Code
was in force will continue for some time, since the disciplinary rule
that will apply is that which was in effect at the time of the
misconduct.' 0

Accordingly, this Article will discuss both the Model Code and the
Model Rules. It will center on the conflicts that arise in the civil litiga-

6. The original model rule read as follows:
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all
the circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or connection with the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of
counsel.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure to the facts. Within the
meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf
of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to
divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of
retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 6 (1908).
7. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980).

8. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT (1983).

9. The Model Rules were adopted as modified in South Carolina on January 9,
1990, by order of the South Carolina Supreme Court, and became effective on September
1, 1990. See S.C. APP. CT. R. 407. The provisions analyzed in this Article are identical
under both,the Model Rules and the South Carolina version of the rules. Therefore, the
modifications found in the South Carolina version are not pertinent to this Article and
will not be addressed.
10. E.g., Sexton v. Supreme Court Comm. on Professional Conduct, 295 Ark. 141,
747 S.W.2d 94 (1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1782 (1990); Kelson v. State Bar, 17 Cal.
3d 1, 4 n.1, 549 P.2d 861, 862 n.1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 29, 30 n.1 (1976); see Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kerpelman, 288 Md. 341, 420 A.2d 940 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970
(1971).
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tion context when a lawyer's existing clients have adverse interests.,,
This Article will proceed on the premise that clients normally should
be free to receive, and attorneys free to provide, representation of
choice,'" but shall focus upon the general restrictions on this freedom
under the professional codes when a conflict exists. This Article also
will analyze the critical language in each code's rule, concentrating on
when representation of existing clients with adverse interests is permissible. Specifically, it will address the way in which the rules are
applied with ranging degrees of strictness depending upon the extent
to which the adverse clients' matters are related."1
II.

ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL LANGUAGE IN THE APPLICABLE RULES UNDER
EACH OF THE PROFESSIONAL CODES

Under the Model Code, representation of existing clients with adverse interests is governed by DR 5-105.14 A similar provision gov-

11. From an analytical perspective, three types of conflicts of interest exist: (1)
conflicts between a lawyer and his client; (2) conflicts between existing clients; and (3)
conflicts between an existing and a former client. Haynsworth, Twenty-Five Common
Conflict of Interest Situations, in LEGAL MALPRACTICE AND ETHICS: Do You KNOW THE
RuLEs? (S.C. Bar Continuing Legal Education Seminar, Dec. 2, 1988). It has been suggested that only the first conflict is properly called a "conflict of interest" and the remaining two are more accurately described as "conflicts of obligation." K. KnNIs, LEGAL
ETHICS 40-55 (1986). The distinction is a simple one, but one worth noting since only the
first situation presents a conflict with the lawyer's own interest, while the others present
conflicts with the lawyer's obligations to his clients.
This Article will address only those rules relating to conflicts between existing clients in a civil litigation context. It does not address conflicts between existing and former clients or between an existing client and the lawyer himself. It also does not address
conflicts arising in criminal litigation or in the nonlitigation context. For a thorough discussion of these and other conflict issues beyond the scope of this Article, see C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS (1986).
12. Cf. In re Vanderbilt Assocs., 111 Bankr. 347, 351 (Bankr. D. Utah), rev'd on
other grounds, 117 Bankr. 678 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990) ("An analysis of conflicts of interest must begin with the premise that debtors should be free to select counsel of their
choice.").
13. This Article analyzes representation of clients with adverse interests in matters
that are related as follows: (1) representation of adverse clients in a single litigation matter, see infra notes 73-83 and accompanying text; (2) representation of adverse clients in
litigation matters that are separate but related, see infra notes 84-94 and accompanying
text; and (3) representation of adverse clients in separate litigation matters that are unrelated, see infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
14. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1980). This rule reads
as follows:
DR 5-105 Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the Interests of Another Client May Impair the Independent Professional Judgment of the
Lawyer.
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his pro-
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erning this type of representation is found in Rule 1.7 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct. 15 Neither DR 5-105 nor Rule 1.7 imposes a blanket prohibition against representing existing clients"6 with
conflicting interests. Instead, they set forth a general rule forbidding
such representation, but allow the attorney to accept or continue the

fessional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it would be likely
to involve him in representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be
adversely affected by his representation of another client, or if it would be
likely to involve him in representing differing interests, except to the extent
permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the
interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure
of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent
professional judgment on behalf of each.
(D) If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from
employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate of, or any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, may accept or continue such
employment.
Id.
15. MODEL RULES OF PROESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 1.7 (1983). This rule reads as
follows:
Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
-will be directly, adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or
to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall
include explanation of the implications of the common representation
and the advantages and risks involved.
Id.
16. Exactly who qualifies as an existing client has been the source of some confusion. Resolving that confusion to unanimous satisfaction is beyond the scope of this Article and, quite probably, the ability of the authors. It generally seems accepted, however,
that a client would be considered an existing client if either the firm has an open file for
him or he is a retainer client. In the latter case, it is immaterial whether the firm has an
active matter for him at the time the new matter is offered. In neither case may the firm
fire one client in favor of a more attractive one in an effort to come within the more
liberal rules governing conflicts with former clients. Haynsworth, supra note 11, at 9-10.
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employment under defined circumstances.
In a fairly common conflict situation, an attorney is offered employment in a matter whose acceptance either could or would have
some bearing on his representation of an existing client. Also fairly
common, prospective clients might seek joint representation in a single
matter, but the matter is one which could result in the clients' ultimately developing conflicting interests, despite the spirit of cooperation present at the inception of the attorney's employment. These situations pose a dilemma for the attorney, who must decide whether he
may accept the proffered employment, and whether he will be able to
remain in the case as it develops. He must consider the requirements
of the professional code applicable in his jurisdiction when he makes
these decisions.
A.

The Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility

If the jurisdiction in which the attorney is practicing follows the
Model Code, he should focus primarily on DR 5-105(A) and (B). These
provisions require him to decline or discontinue the employment if acceptance or continuance could or would adversely affect his independent professional judgment on behalf of a client. 17 The requirements of
subsections (A) and (B), however, are subject to the exception set forth
in subsection (C), which permits the lawyer to undertake or continue
simultaneous representation if the following two conditions are met:
first, it is obvious that the lawyer can represent adequately the interest
of each client; and second, each client consents after full disclosure of
the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of the lawyer's independent professional judgment. 8
1. The "Adverse Effect" Requirement
The requirement that the simultaneous representation adversely
affect the attorney's professional judgment before DR 5-105 is triggered is really no requirement at all. Courts presume an adverse effect
on an attorney's independent professional judgment when he takes an
adversarial position toward another client. 9 DR 5-105 is triggered the
moment an attorney undertakes such representation and no specific

17. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmmTY DR 5-105(A)-(B) (1980).

18. Id. DR 5-105(C).
19. Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., 869 F.2d 578, 581 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Harte

Biltmore Ltd. v. First Pa. Bank, 655 F. Supp. 419, 421 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Bankers Trust v.
Bruce, 283 S.C. 408, 418 n.1, 323 S.E.2d 523, 530 n.1 (Ct. App. 1984).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss4/5

6

Schmidt and McKelvey: Conflicts
of Interest
Among Existing Clients: The Civil Litigator
CONFLICTS
OF INTEREST
1991]

adverse effect needs to be demonstrated.20
2. The "Obvious" Requirement
Conversely, the requirement that it be obvious the attorney can
adequately represent the interests of each client is real indeed. Nonetheless, considerable confusion exists regarding this requirement. 21 The
difficulty has resulted from the word "obvious," especially in light of
the presumption that an attorney's professional judgment is marred
once he undertakes representation adverse to another client. As one
court noted, "Once it is shown that the exercise of the lawyer's independent professional judgment would be or would likely be adversely
affected ... ,how could it ever be 'obvious'
that he could adequately
'22
represent the interest of each party?
Mindful that such an interpretation would defeat the test 23 set

forth in DR 5-105, however, most courts have rejected the proposition
that once an adverse effect is established, it is never "obvious" an attorney can adequately represent the interests of each client.24 In doing
so, courts have kept the "obvious" requirement alive, although they
rarely define the circumstances which have led them to the conclusion
that a questioned representation is obviously adequate. 25 Instead,

20. Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981);
International Business Machs. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 1978); see Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976).
21. It has been said "that what is and is not obvious within the meaning of DR 5105(C) is not obvious." Fordham, There are SubstantialLimitations on Representation
of Clients in Litigation which are not Obvious in the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, 33 Bus. LAw. 1193, 1198 (1978). It also is not obvious from whose perspective the
adequacy of representation should be measured: that of the reasonable lawyer or that of
the attorney whose representation is being questioned. Developments, supra note 3, at
1304. Some guidance may be found in the Annotated Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, which states, "Without belaboring the point, we think 'obvious' must refer to an
objective standard under which the ability of the attorney adequately to represent each
client is free from substantial doubt." A IicAN BAR AsSOcATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 243 (1979).

22. In re Porter, 283 Or. 517, 528 n.5, 584 P.2d 744, 749 n.5 (1978) (emphasis in
original), modified, In re Conduct of Johnson, 300 Or. 52, 707 P.2d 573 (1985).
23. This interpretation would abolish the first prong of the test (requiring adequate representation be obvious), as well as the second prong (requiring consent to the
representation). If the attorney could not represent adequately the interests of both parties, the existence or absence of consent would be irrelevant. See Unified Sewerage, 646
F.2d at 1348-50.
24. E.g., id. at 1347 (expressly rejecting the analysis and conclusion of the Porter
court).
25. But see id. at 1350. The court in Unified Sewerage stated:
In determining whether it is obvious that an attorney can represent adverse parties, the court should look at factors such as: the nature of the litiga-
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courts typically discuss the "obvious" requirement with any measure of
detail only in cases involving actual conflicts that are essentially
28

indisputable.

Undoubtedly, these cases show that the "obvious" requirement is
one which cannot be ignored. Even when the attorney has obtained
consent to his undertaking of the representation, if there exists an impermissible conflict, courts will disqualify the attorney on the ground
that it is not obvious he can adequately represent the interest of each
client.

27

3.

The "Consent" Requirement

Just as it must be obvious an attorney can adequately represent
the interest of each client, even if he has obtained consent to the representation, so too must there be consent, even if it is obvious the representation would be adequate. 28 Determining the existence or absence of
effective consent, however, is not always a simple task. A number of
factors must be considered, including whether consent was obtained at
all, 29 and, if so, whether it was informed.3 0
Whether or not consent was obtained at all frequently is a subject
of dispute.:" This may pose a problem for the attorney who fails to get
consent in writing because the burden of proving consent is always

tion; the type of information to which the lawyer may have had access; whether
the client is in a position to protect his interest or know whether he will be
vulnerable to disadvantage as a result of the multiple representation; the questions in dispute (e.g., statutory construction versus disputes over facts) and
whether a government body is involved.
Id.; but see also Bankers Trust v. Bruce, 283 S.C. 408, 419, 323 S.E.2d 523, 530 (Ct. App.
1984) (detailing reasons why, under facts of that case, it was obvious that the accused
firm could adequately represent interests of both clients).
26. Developments, supra note 3, at 1305 & n.98.
27. See, e.g., In re Bentley, 141 Ariz. 593, 688 P.2d 601 (1984). The Arizona Supreme Court held that despite the consent of both the judgment debtor and creditor, the
attorney who had represented the creditor in obtaining the judgment against the debtor
could not represent the debtor in matters that would enable the debtor to pay the creditor under an agreed plan. The court concluded that, considering the debtor's past payment record, it was obvious that a dispute could arise about the agreement. Id. at 596,
688 P.2d at 604.
28. See generally Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir.
1981) (discussing the importance of satisfying both prongs of the test set forth in DR 5105).
29. See, e.g., Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., 869 F.2d 578 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (disqualification of attorneys for failure to obtain consent).
30. See, e.g., City Consumer Servs., Inc. v. Home, 571 F. Supp. 965, 971 (C.D. Utah
1983) (client's consent must be informed after full disclosure).
31. See, e.g., In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413 (Utah 1978).
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upon the attorney, even though as a general rule, the movant in a motion for disqualification has the burden of proof.3 2 Failure either to obtain consent 33 or to meet the burden of proving it3 4 invariably will result in disqualification."5
Even in cases in which an attorney can prove he obtained consent,
3' 6
however, the consent is ineffective unless it is "informed consent.

Informed consent can be given by a client only after he has received
"full and effective disclosure of all material, relevant facts and circumstances which, in the judgment of a lawyer of ordinary skill and capacity, are necessary to enable his client to [make] an informed [decision]. ' 37 If the lawyer is able to demonstrate to the court that he has
engaged in full and effective disclosure and has obtained the clients'
knowing and intelligent consent, 8 he will find that in almost all cases

32. In re Corn Derivatives Antitrust Litig., 748 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 1984).
33. See, e.g., Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976); Killian
v. Iowa Dist. Court, 452 N.W.2d 426 (Iowa 1990).
34. See, e.g., Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., 869 F.2d 578 (Fed. Cir. 1989);
International Business Machs. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978).
35. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 33-34.
36. Cf. In re Wilkinson, 242 Kan. 133, 143, 744 P.2d 1214, 1220 (1987) (in context
of lawyer's interest conflicting with client's, court held uninformed consent was insufficient to exempt lawyer from requirements of DR 5-105).
37. Bankers Trust v. Bruce, 283 S.C. 408, 420, 323 S.E.2d 523, 530 (Ct. App. 1984);
see In re Boivin, 271 Or. 419, 424, 533 P.2d 171, 174 (1975), limited by In re Johnson,
300 Or. 52, 707 P.2d 573 (1985). The court in Boivin stated:
To satisfy the requirement of full disclosure by a lawyer before undertaking to
represent two conflicting interests, it is not sufficient that both parties be informed of the fact that the lawyer is undertaking to represent both of them,
but he must explain to them the nature of the conflict of interest in such detail
so that they can understand the reasons why it may be desirable for each to
have independent counsel, with undivided loyalty to the interests of each of
them.
Id.
38. As one commentator has noted, the "cases pragmatically recognize the differences in legal sophistication and knowledge among various clients." Developments, supra
note 3, at 1313. Typically, courts scrutinize consent given by lay clients, but are willing
to assume an understanding of potential or real conflicts by knowledgeable corporate
officers and employees who grant consent on behalf of their businesses. See id. at 131213. This point is illustrated by Allegaert v. Perot, 434 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 565
F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1977), in which the court found that the lawyer's clients, who were
Wall Street brokerage firms, could not succeed in claims that the attorney failed to make
potential conflicts clear in light of "the sophistication of all persons involved ..... Id.
at 799 n.13. For additional cases arriving at similar conclusions, see Developments, supra
note 3, at 1312 n.143. Surely it is unwise to rely on a client's supposed sophistication in
legal or business matters to satisfy the informed consent requirement, however, since
potential conflicts often are difficult to recognize and it is ultimately up to the courts to
determine whether the client, on behalf of a corporation or not, appreciated the meaning
of his consent. See id. at 1313.
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the consent will be upheld.39
Courts that refuse to uphold consent under these circumstances
typically do so, at least partially, out of concern for the perceived integrity of the legal profession and the judicial process. 40 They note that
civil litigants do not have an absolute right to retain particular counsel,41 and that "maintenance of the integrity of the legal profession and
its high standing in the community are important additional factors to
be considered .

*."..,

While few attorneys would argue against the

proposition that these are indeed important additional factors, courts
must be careful not to allow them to become overriding factors. To do
so would result in a per se rule against multiple representation, which,
as noted, would defeat the purpose of DR 5-105. 4 1 As the court commented in Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc.,44 "[a court's] responsibility is to preserve a balance, delicate though it may be, between an individual's right to his own freely chosen counsel and 'the
4' 5
avoidance of representation where undivided loyalty is impossible.
B.

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct

If the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is practicing does not follow
the Model Code but has adopted the Model Rules, then the attorney
should focus primarily on Rule 1.7. This rule does not differ materially
from DR 5-105 except in locution, which at least arguably eliminates
some of the ambiguity of the Model Code. Rule 1.7 requires a lawyer to
decline or discontinue representation of a client if the representation
will be either: (1) directly adverse to another client; or (2) materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client.4 But as with

39. See, e.g., Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981)
(law firm could represent both parties adequately); Bankers Trust v. Bruce, 283 S.C. 408,

323 S.E.2d 523 (Ct. App. 1984) (court found full and effective disclosure of relevant facts
and circumstances).
40. See, e.g., Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 264, 267 (D. Del. 1979)
(court's obligation to resolve ethics problems is owed not only to the parties before it and
their law firms, but also to the profession and the public).

41. E.g., Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1093 (3d Cir. 1976); cf.
Schwarzer, Dealing With Incompetent Counsel-The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 633, 666 n.143 (1980) (no case has been found supporting a Fourteenth Amendment
right to appointed counsel in civil cases).
42. International Business Machs. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 283 (3d Cir. 1978).
43. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
44. 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981).
45. Id. at 1350. The court also noted, "We think the Code strikes a balance on the
side of an individual's right to choose his own counsel and against a per se rule forbidding multiple representation." Id.
46. MODEL RULES

OF

PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.7(a)-(b) (1983).
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the general prohibition in the Model Code, Rule 1.7 is tempered significantly by an exception which permits the representation if the lawyer
reasonably believes there will be no adverse effect to representation 4of
the client, and the lawyer obtains client consent after consultation. 7
1. The "Adverse Effect" Requirement
Rule 1.7 is divided into subsections (a) and (b), which essentially
address simultaneous representation from two opposing perspectives. 4s
Subsection (a) approaches the representation from the perspective of
the existing client. 49 It requires an attorney not to accept or continue
representation that "will be directly adverse to another client" 50 unless
the attorney reasonably believes the representation will not have an
adverse effect on the relationship with that client and each client consents after consultation. 51
Subsection (b) focuses on the representation from a prospective
client's point of view.5 2 It disallows the representation if the attorney's
efforts on the prospective client's behalf "may be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client"5 3 unless the attorney
reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected
54
and the prospective client consents after consultation.
But regardless of whether the existing client, the prospective client, or both assert the adverse effect, it is unlikely a court would require that adverse effect actually be proved by one challenging the representation before Rule 1.7 is triggered. 5 As with DR 5-105, courts
generally can be expected to presume an adverse effect under Rule 1.7
once the attorney undertakes representation that requires opposition

47. Id.

48. C.WOLFRAM,

supra note 11, at 350.

49. Id.
50. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (1983). One change from
the Model Code is the requirement in Rule 1.7(a) that the representation be directly
adverse to another client. Exactly what is meant by the word "directly," however, is not
completely clear. The comment to Rule 1.7 suggests the rule is intended generally to
prohibit all degrees of direct advocacy against the client, but not to proscribe representation which requires only that the lawyer take a position which is generally adverse to the
client, such as representing an economic competitor. See id. Rule 1.7 comment.
51. Id.
52. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 11, at 350.
53. MODEL RuLEs OF PaOFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 1.7(b) (1983).
54. Id.

55. Although no case directly on point has been found, judicial decisions interpreting the "adverse effect" requirement under DR 5-105 demonstrate the soundness of this
contention. For citation and discussion of these cases, see supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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2. The "ReasonableBelief" Requirement
As noted previously, considerable confusion exists concerning
whether the "obvious" requirement of the Model Code is to be judged
by an objective or a subjective standard.5 7 The Model Rules' requirement that the lawyer "reasonably believe" the representation will not
be adversely affected is an intended clarification of the Model Code.58
in that the language of the rule
The improvement is slight, however,
59
debatable.
standard
the
leaves
still
The Model Rules define the terms "reasonable belief" and "reasonably believes" to mean "that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable." 60 The fact that the lawyer must believe the matter in question
suggests the standard is subjective, but the requirement that his belief
be reasonable suggests the standard is objective. Despite the lack of
clarity in this purported clarification, the61 prevailing view of the courts
is that the standard is an objective one.
Thus, the courts have measured the propriety of simultaneous representation of adverse interests by considering whether a reasonable
attorney under the same circumstances would have undertaken the
representation6 2 and once undertaken, whether he would have contin-

56. See supra note 55.
57. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
58. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.7 model code comparison

(1983).
59. See Developments, supra note 3, at 1304 n.96.
60.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT

terminology (1983).

61. See, e.g., Clay v. Doherty, 608 F. Supp. 295, 302 n.5 (N.D. IM.1985). The court
in Clay explained, "Under the Code the 'it is obvious' language established an independent third condition, over and above the requirements of full disclosure and consent.
Model Rule 1.7 deliberately changed that locution but retained the objective standard
by stating the matter in terms of the lawyer's 'reasonable belief.' " Id. (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
62. The Mississippi Supreme Court articulated the test under Rule 1.7 in Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255 (Miss. 1988). The court stated:
Where the interests of the two parties are in some manner antagonistic to one
another, before any lawyer is authorized to assume dual representation (or continue if the adversity appears after he has been retained), he must first satisfy
himself that there is no objective reason why he cannot, despite such divergency of interest, faithfully represent them both. If this cannot be met, the
lawyer should not accept employment in the first place (or terminate it, if begun). Secondly, even if the lawyer reasonably (and from an objective point of
view) believes he can faithfully represent dual parties with adverse interests,
he still must fully explain all implications of the advantages as well as the risks
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ued it as the case developed.13 Furthermore, this objective first prong
of the test to determine whether the representation is permissible must
be satisfied whether or not the attorney has satisfied the second prong
by obtaining client consent."
3. The "Consent" Requirement
From the preceding statement, it is clear that meeting one prong
of the two-prong test will not satisfy the requirements for representing
parties with adverse interests. Thus, under Rule 1.7, just as consent
cannot cure representation of adverse interests in cases in which the
lawyer does not reasonably believe he can adequately represent each
client,6 5 neither can the lawyer's reasonable belief that he can provide
adequate representation cure his failure to obtain client consent.6
Although the consent requirement under Rule 1.7 has been criticized for its failure to resolve the question of what is required under
the Model Code's demand that consent be given only after "full disclosure," 67 Rule 1.7 is at least as clear as the Model Code and, with benefit of the comment, probably more so. First, the rule plainly imposes
upon the lawyer the duty to consult with the clients before they consent.6 8 If the representation is of multiple clients in a single matter, the
consultation must "include explanation of the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved."69 It is true
the rule does not define the scope of the consultation under other circumstances, but the potential abuse to result from this failure to define
the contents is tempered significantly by the comment to Rule 1.7,
which provides that "[a] client may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. . . , [but] when a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the representation under the
circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot ask for such agreement or
provide -epresentation on the basis of the client's consent. 7 0 This provision implicitly requires the attorney adequately to inform the client

of his representation to both parties, and assure himself that they both have
given knowing and informed consent.
Id. at 268.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 11, at 344 n.78 (citing Schneyer, The Model Rules and
Problems of Code Interpretationand Enforcement, 1980 AM. B. FouNI. REs. J. 939, 94142).
68. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 1.7(a)(2), (b)(2) (1983).

69. Id. Rule 1.7(b)(2).

70. Id. Rule 1.7 comment.
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whatever the circumstances
before the obtained consent can be
1
deemed effective.

Accordingly, the critical language in both DR 5-105 and Rule 1.7
requires the attorney to consider carefully the possibility that his acceptance or continuance of multiple employment may divide his loy-,
alty or impair his judgment.7 2 In weighing the reasons for and against
accepting or continuing representation when it involves litigation, the
lawyer must assess his obligations and options in light of the particular
factual situation. Specifically, he must consider whether the representation involves a single matter that is related to his representation of
an existing client, a separate matter that is related to his representation of an existing client, or a separate matter that is unrelated to his
representation of an existing client.
III.

APPLICATION OF THE

RULES

RESTRICTING ADVERSE PARTY

REPRESENTATION: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MATTERS IS DETERMINATIVE

A.

Single LitigationMatter Related to Representation of Existing
Client

If an attorney is offered employment in a single litigation matter, a
conflict with an existing client typically will arise, if at all, under one of
two circumstances. First, an existing or prospective client will ask the
attorney either to bring or defend a lawsuit against a party whom the
attorney already represents or is committed to represent in the particular matter. In this case, the attorney should decline the representation .

An attorney cannot represent both a plaintiff and a defendant

71. See In re Vanderbilt Assocs., 111 Bankr. 347, 352 (Bankr. D. Utah), rev'd on
other grounds, 117 Bankr. 678 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990) ("The Rules ...provide however
that the client may be able to relinquish its right to a conflict-free representation if the

client is fully informed.") (emphasis added).
72. This proposition and analysis of the rules are supported by the Ethical Considerations under the Model Code and the comments under the Model Rules. See MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.7 comment (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFES-

SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-15 (1980). It should be noted that neither the Ethical Considerations nor the comments are mandatory. Instead, the Ethical Considerations are
aspirational and represent the objectives toward which lawyers should strive. MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsiaiLrrY preliminary statement (1980). Similarly, the comments serve not as additional obligations, but as tools to guide lawyers toward appropriate practice under the Rules. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT scope (1983).
73. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.7 comment (1983) ("paragraph (a) prohibits representation of opposing parties in litigation"); MODEL CODE OF

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-15 (1980) ("[a] lawyer should never represent in litigation multiple parties with differing interests"). Under both professional codes, the law-

yer's disqualification also would extend to members of his firm. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(a) (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsIBmrrY
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in a single suit.7 ' This prohibition is so sound it requires little discus-

sion. It would be impossible for an attorney to undertake this kind of
representation and still fulfill his obligation to act in the matter solely
for the benefit of and with undivided loyalty to his client.75
Second, the prospective or existing clients may seek joint representation in litigation matters.7 6 Unlike cases in which the representation is of parties on opposing sides of the case, lawyers can jointly represent the coparties. As a general rule, "[m]ost coparty-conflict
problems can be cured by client consent."7 7 However, these conflicts
are not always easy to recognize at the outset. Regardless of this difficulty, a lawyer who intends to undertake coparty representation has a
duty of loyalty and competence to investigate each party's potential
cross-claims or cross-defenses.78 If it appears one party could assert a

DR 5-105(D) (1980).
74. E.g., Jedwabny v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 390 Pa. 231, 235, 135 A.2d 252, 254
(1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 966 (1958); see also In re Morgan, 288 S.C. 401, 343 S.E.2d
29 (1986) (attorney hired by client in financial difficulty to find buyer for client's home
could not bring eviction action against client on behalf of buyer whom attorney also
agreed to represent in the transaction). But see Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
Daniel Int'l Corp., 563 F.2d 671, 673-74 (5th Cir. 1977) (court allowed sister corporations
who were nominally adverse to have same counsel in what was basically a collusive lawsuit); Klemm v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1977) (court
permitted representation of nominally opposing parties who sought same judgment and
whose interests were not antagonistic).
75. This is a fair statement of the standard imposed by each of the professional
codes. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.7 comment (1983); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILrrY EC 5-1 (1980).
76. Perhaps the most notable account of conflicts resulting from this type of representation can be traced to the 1916 Senate confirmation hearings on Louis D. Brandeis's
nomination to the United States Supreme Court. Conservative opposition to President
Wilson's nominee charged that Brandeis had acted improperly while in practice when,
among other things, he put together a business deal between parties who had competing
interests, represented a family business and continued to do so even after a falling out
within the family required reorganization, and mediated a dispute and adjusted interests
among owners and creditors of a floundering business in order to keep it afloat. Brandeis
responded to these charges by saying that he did not consider himself the lawyer for one
of these parties to the detriment of the other, but as the "lawyer for the situation." Of
course, the Senate ultimately confirmed Justice Brandeis, but at least one commentator
suggests this is due less to collapse of the charges than to concessions by other reputable
attorneys that they often had engaged in the exact conduct. G. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN
THE PRACTICE OF LAW 58-68 (1978). Such a defense would be unlikely to succeed today,
whether before the Senate, a court, or a disciplinary panel.
77. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 11, at 354.
78. Id. at 353; cf. In re Vanderbilt Assocs., 111 Bankr. 347, 353 (Bankr. D. Utah),
rev'd on other grounds, 117 Bankr. 678 (Bankr. D. Utah 1990) ("Counsel representing
debtors in possession have a duty to search for potential conflicts affecting loyalty and
confidentiality, to disclose the same, and to seriously analyze whether consent to a conflict can be given by the client.").
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claim or defense against the other, the lawyer may not proceed unless
the conflict can be consented to and he obtains each client's consent
after fully disclosing the nature of their potentially
conflicting interests
78
and the risks accompanying joint representation.
The requirement that the conflict be consented to is extremely important and must not be overlooked. Indeed, both the Model Code and
the Model Rules proceed upon the premise that serious conflicts of interest cannot always be cured by consent.10 Under the Model Code,
this point is illustrated by the fact that mere client consent is insufficient. Not only must the consent follow full disclosure, but it must be
obvious that the attorney can represent adequately the interest of each
client."1 The Model Rules similarly permit the representation after
consent only if both the consent is given after consultation and the
attorney reasonably
believes his representation will not be affected by
8 2
the conflict.

But even full compliance with the tests set forth in the Model
Code and the Model Rules will not ensure that consent will be upheld.
Some courts have demonstrated a willingness to disqualify or discipline
attorneys despite compliance with the rules whenever they have determined the conflict is simply too severe to be cured.8 3 Thus, the prudent
attorney will make positive efforts to discover potential cross-claims or
cross-defenses among coparties. If any exist, he will decline the joint
representation if the parties are not able to consent to the conflict. If
they are able to consent, he will fully comply with the test set forth in
the applicable professional code, being especially certain to adhere to
the essentially parallel requirement that he be able to properly represent the interest of each client, which avoids the later determina-

79. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 11, at 353-54. Dean Harry Haynsworth writes that in
situations in which the lawyer is not precluded from proceeding with joint representation, the lawyer must make an objective determination that he or she can adequately
represent each of the joint clients, obtain the informed consent of each of the clients
after full disclosure of all of the potential conflicts that might arise, explain that the
attorney-client privilege does not apply to joint clients, and explain that in the event a
disqualifying conflict arises during the course of the litigation, the lawyer must withdraw
completely from the case and each of the joint clients will have to obtain new counsel.
Haynsworth, supra note 11, at 10.
80. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 11, at 340.
81. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmu.rry DR 5-105(C) (1980); see also

supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text (discussing the "obvious" requirement).
82. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983) see also supra notes

57-64 and accompanying text (discussing the "reasonable belief" requirement).
83. See, e.g., Greene v. Greene, 47 N.Y.2d 447, 451-52, 391 N.E.2d 1355, 1358, 418
N.Y.S.2d 379, 382 (1979); see also C. WOLFRAM, supra note 11, at 342 & notes 62-64
(recognizing the stated proposition and citing authority in support); Annotation, What
Constitutes Representationof Conflicting Interests Subjecting Attorney to Disciplinary
Action, 17 A.L.R.3D 835, 841 (1968 & Supp. 1990) (same).
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tion that the conflict was too severe to be cured by consent.
B. Separate Litigation Matter Related to Representation of
Existing Client
In contrast to the situation in which an attorney represents a client in a particular case and is asked to undertake representation in
direct opposition to that client in the same case, no blanket prohibition
exists against accepting employment adverse to an existing client in a
litigation matter that is separate from, even though related to, the
matter in which the existing client is being represented. But the absence of an express prohibition does not mean that representation
under these facts generally is permissible. To the contrary, courts have
demonstrated an almost uniform practice of disqualifying8 or disciplining attorneys who engage in this type of representation. 4
Still, courts have stopped short of declaring that such representation is per se intolerable.8 5 Instead, they typically have disciplined or
disqualified attorneys in these cases because of the lawyer's inability to
represent adequately the interest of each client, his failure to obtain
the required client consent, or judicial concern that the attorney could
misuse information gained in confidence.88
For example, the Arizona Supreme Court stated in In re Bentley,
that although it is not always improper to represent opposing parties
simultaneously, an attorney may do so only if he can represent each
client adequately. 8 The Bentley court determined that the representation in that case was improper because the attorney for the creditor,
who had obtained for his client a judgment against the debtor, undertook representation of the debtor in related89 financial matters which

84. See, e.g., cases cited and discussed infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.

85. Developments, supra note 3, at 1307. But see In re Garber, 95 N.J. 597, 472
A.2d 566 (1984). The court in Garber, stating a rule shared by few other jurisdictions,
declared: "It is patently unethical for a lawyer in a legal proceeding to represent an
individual whose interests are adverse to another party whom the lawyer represents in
other matters, even if the two representations are not related." Id. at 607, 472 A.2d at
572. Because the court reached this strict conclusion on unrelated matters, it necessarily
follows that it would have reached the same conclusion if it had been presented with
facts showing the representations to be related.
86. See, e.g., cases cited and discussed infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
87. 141 Ariz. 593, 688 P.2d 601 (1984).
88. Id. at 596, 688 P.2d at 604.
89. Although the court characterized the attorney's representation of the debtor as
one dealing with matters "unrelated" to his representation of the creditor, that characterization probably is inaccurate. The attorney himself acknowledged the relationship of
the representations in a letter to the creditor, in which he wrote, "as [the debtor's] attorney, I will become privy to certain information relative to his assets
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would have enabled the debtor to pay off the judgment, and subsequently sued the debtor when he failed to satisfy the debt.90 The court
censured the attorney, holding it was not obvious the attorney could
adequately represent the interest of each client as required by the
Model Code.9 1
Other courts also have demonstrated an unwillingness to tolerate
representation of opposing parties in litigation of related matters when
the representation is not in strict compliance with prescribed ethical
precepts. An illustrative case is Killian v. Iowa District Court.92 In Killian the Iowa Supreme Court disqualified an attorney from representation of one beneficiary in a suit against trustees because he already
represented in a similar suit another beneficiary whose already-reached
settlement agreement could have been jeopardized as a result of the
multiple representation. 3 The court did not hold the representation to
be absolutely proscribed, but was persuaded to disqualify the attorney
in that case because he did not obtain the required client consent and,
which could have been used to
at least arguably, possessed information
94
the first client's disadvantage.
Thus, an attorney presented with making the decision of whether
to undertake or continue representation of opposing parties in litigation matters that are separate but related may proceed generally under
the premise that his representation is not in itself violative of the applicable provisions in either the Model Code or the Model Rules. He
should proceed cautiously, however, and be aware that courts typically
look upon such representation with disfavor. It is imperative, therefore,
that he carefully consider the factual situation, taking pains to ensure
that it is obvious he can adequately represent the interests of each cli-

outstanding judgment." Id. at 594, 688 P.2d at 602.
90. Id. at 594-97, 688 P.2d at 602-05.
91. Id. at 597, 688 P.2d at 605. Two additional facts about Bentley should be
noted. First, it seems the court also based its decision in part on Canon 9 of the Model
Code, since it concluded its decision with reference to not only the actual conflict that
arose, but also the appearance of impropriety that resulted from the representation. Id.
Second, the court pointed out that consent was given by both clients in this case. That
fact was not determinative, however, since "[e]ven with full disclosure, not all conflicts
can be waived by consent of the parties." Id. at 596, 688 P.2d at 604. In support of this
second point, the court quoted from the comment to Model Rule 1.7, which states that
"'[w]hen a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the
representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for
such agreement or provide representation on the -basis of the client's consent.'" Id. at
596-97, 688 P.2d at 604-05 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 1.7
comment (1980)).
92. 452 N.W.2d 426 (Iowa 1990).
93. Id. at 427-30.
94. Id. at 429-30.
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ent, that he has obtained the informed consent of each, and that he
possesses no confidential information that could be used against the
existing client.
C. Separate Litigation Matter Unrelated to Representation of
Existing Client
Because courts almost unanimously have declined to impose a per
se rule against representing parties with opposing interests in litigation
matters that are separate but related, it is logical that they also typically have refused to impose such a rule when the litigation matters are
separate and unrelated.9 5 Courts generally have adhered to this practice even though some ethics committees have attempted to establish a
per se rule against accepting proffered or continued employment in
this situation. 6
The fact that the matter in which the attorney is asked to oppose
an existing client is unrelated to his representation of that client does
not mean, however, that the requirements that the attorney be able to
adequately represent the interests of each client and that he obtain the
consent of each need not be satisfied. Although the Model Code does
97
not expressly require compliance with.DR 5-105(C) in such cases,
courts interpreting the provision have demonstrated a willingness to

95. See Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1349 (9th Cir. 1981)
(court analyzing the questioned representation under DR 5-105 and noting that while it
did not encourage opposing an existing client, even in an unrelated matter, it was "not
prepared to enunciate a per se rule that a client must forego in all circumstances his
choice of a particular attorney merely because there is the foreseeability of a future conflict
with one of the attorney's existing clients"). But see In re Garber, 95 N.J. 597, 472
A.2d 566 (1984).
96. For instance, the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility has issued an informal opinion stating that a lawyer may not
accept employment adverse to an existing client, even in an unrelated matter. ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1495 (1982). For similar
opinions from state ethics committees, see Mass. Ethics Comm., Op. 80-10 (1980); N.J.
Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 507 (1982). It is important to note that the
Code's disciplinary rules, which ethics committees are charged with interpreting, were
drafted for use in disciplinary proceedings and were not intended to be used as rules
governing disqualification motions. Consequently, disciplinary bodies are not bound by
judicial interpretation or application of rules from cases that have dealt with disqualification. In other words, an attorney may be disciplined for unethical conduct even if a
court determines the conduct does not warrant disqualification. This situation rarely occurs, however, because courts typically rely on the rules as guidelines in cases in which
disqualification of an attorney is at issue. See, e.g., Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844,
846-47 (1st Cir. 1984); Unified Sewerage, 646 F.2d at 1342 n.1; Central Milk Prod. Coop.
v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 993 (8th Cir. 1978).
97. See MODEL CODE: OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmniTy DR 5-105(C) (1980).
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permit the adverse representation in an unrelated matter only when it
is obvious the attorney can represent adequately the interest of each
and he has obtained the required client consent. 8
As for the Model Rules, the comment to Rule 1.7 does address
specifically representation adverse to an existing client in matters unrelated to those in which the attorney represents that client. The comment states that "[a]s a general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without
that client's consent . .

.

.Thus, a lawyer ordinarily may not act as

advocate against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter,
even if it is wholly unrelated." 99 Since a lawyer may not even ask for
consent unless he reasonably believes he can provide adequate representation, 10 0 it is clear from the comment that Rule 1.7 contemplates
permissible representation of adverse interests in unrelated matters
only when the lawyer both holds this reasonable belief and has obtained client consent to the representation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Because of the extraordinarily high fiduciary duty a lawyer owes to
his clients, he should take every reasonable precaution to protect his
clients' interests. The professional codes demand no less. But the codes
wisely stop short of imposing an absolute prohibition against representing parties with adverse interests in most cases. 10' In fact, the
codes expressly provide that such representation is permissible under
defined circumstances.10 2 Furthermore, courts interpreting the applicable rules within each code almost unanimously have refused to impose
a per se rule proscribing representation of parties with adverse interests.'0 3 Accordingly, a lawyer presented with a situation in which representation of clients with adverse interests is an issue should not immediately assume he must decline or withdraw. To do so, in many cases,
would 0 undermine
the important principle of representation of
4
1

choice.

98, See, e.g., Unified Sewerage, 646 F.2d at 1345-47.

99. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.7 comment (1983) (emphasis
added).
100, See id.
101. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
102. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a)(1)-(2) (1983); MODEL
CODE oF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSImILrrY DR 5-105(C) (1980) (specifically providing excep-

tion to general rule against representation of clients with adverse interests) (same).
103. See, e.g., supra notes 85 and 95 and accompanying text.

104. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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Instead, as has been demonstrated throughout this Article, the
lawyer should consider closely the critical language of the applicable
rule in light of the circumstances surrounding the representation, especially the extent to which the adverse clients' matters are related. This
often will lead the attorney to the conclusion that the representation of
both clients is impermissible. If that is the case, he should decline or
withdraw immediately. But when he is led to the opposite conclusion
after an objective and thorough analysis of the rules, cases, and principles detailed in this work and others,10 5 he may accept or continue the
representation, confident that the applicable precepts are being followed as intended.

105. The prudent attorney always will analyze personally the applicable rules and
controlling cases in his jurisdiction, but should build upon his analysis with reference to
secondary authorities. For two excellent reference works, see Developments, supra note 3
and C. WOLFRAM, supra note 11.
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